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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE REPORT

COUNTRY Mongolian People's Republic

DATE: 25X1X6

INFO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Military Information: Army Organization

DIST. 24 February 1947

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SUPPLEMENT

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1. The peacetime military strength of the Mongolian People's Republic consists of the First and Second Armies and the Internal Affairs Army. In wartime a Third Army is organized.
2. The Internal Affairs Army is responsible for the security within the national boundaries. It is composed of military police and intelligence and counter-intelligence workers. Border garrison troops, besides patrolling the border, are responsible for gathering intelligence in the area fifteen kilometers beyond the Mongolian People's Republic boundary line.
3. This Interior Garrison Army was reported in September to have a strength of 5,000 men [? see note].

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Note: It was previously reported that the strength of the ground forces was 50,000.

4. Units and locations are as follows:

Army Headquarters

Ulan Bator (106-53, 47-55)

1 Army Headquarters

Ulan Bator

1 Division

Ulan Bator

2 Division

Ulan Bator

3 Division

Dalay Sayn Shanda (110-09, 44-52)

4 Division

Sayr Usa (106-54, 44-48)

One mechanized brigade

Ulan Bator

2 Army Headquarters

Tsuipalusangshih (確巴魯桑市)

5 Division

/? Bayan Tumen, 114-30, 48-04

6 Division

Tsuipalusangshih

Tamossuke (達莫斯克)

7 Division

/? Tomsoq Bulag, 117-35, 47-20

8 Division

Pasuntu (巴達圖)

(? Bai Shente Daba, 105-36, 48-36)

One mechanized Brigade

Matatu (馬達圖) / ? Matad Sume, 115-30, 47-20

Matatu

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3 Army (activated only during wartime)
Four divisions

Airforce Headquarters

Tauipalusangshih

5. A division consists of three cavalry regiments and one artillery battalion composed of one 105 mm. howitzer company, one 75 mm. howitzer company and one 4.5 anti-tank company. With each division there is a motor battalion of three companies, a quartermaster truck battalion, a signal company, a chemical warfare company, an engineer company and a field hospital.
6. The airforce consists only of C-2 model training planes used for liaison purposes between army units, a few "B-15" and "B-16" /? B-15 and B-16/ models and "SB" model old-style bombers obtained from the USSR. Armored cars are equipped with old Russian weapons; their engines are generally of American-made four-cylinder Fords. Most of the weapons are Russian, manufactured in 1936 and 1938. The artillery battalions have been recently equipped with 1945 model Russian artillery pieces; trench mortars are also 1945 models.
7. During the Japanese occupation, the Outer Mongolians placed military bases at points where the Kwantung Army might attack. The Mongolian 4 Cavalry Division and the Soviet 36 Mechanized Division were stationed at Dalay Sayn Shanda which is on the main road between Kalgan and Ulan Bator. They believed that the Japanese would approach through Kalgan in the event of war between the Mongolian People's Republic and the Kwantung Army. Tauipalusangshih was made a major military supply depot.
8. The following is a list of the assets in the characteristics of Outer Mongolian soldiers:
 - a. They obey orders without questions; they are willing to fight under adverse circumstances and can endure hardships.
 - b. They are very good marksmen and excellent scouts because of their keen powers of observation.
 - c. They are very skillful in cavalry tactics.
 - d. Their most remarkable characteristic is their skill in guerrilla warfare and sudden attacks.
 - e. They are not adversely influenced by changes of weather on the desert.
9. The following is a list of the liabilities in the characteristics of the Outer Mongolian soldiers:
 - a. They are uneducated.
 - b. Unfamiliar weapons of the enemy quickly and easily confuse them.
 - c. Their cavalry tactics make them unfit for position warfare.
 - d. They are very superstitious, becoming easy prey for psychological warfare and propaganda.
 - e. Their blind obedience to superior officers renders them ineffective when they are compelled to fight without leaders.

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